Category: EGD

Mihaela writes*

For thirty years El Salvador has been under the control of two gangs, MS-13 and Barrio 18. Leaders had tried to dismantle the gangs and put an end to their reign of terror over the general public. However, only one leader has been successful so far in bringing safety to the country, President Nayib Bukele who has been in power since 2019.

It all began in March of 2022, when Bukele declared a national state of emergency sending the military to the streets, suspending constitutional rights, and most notably, carrying out mass imprisonments of anyone who even seemed to be affiliated with a gang, which brought the incarceration numbers to eighty thousand. He embraced mano dura (iron fist) crime policies that were aggressive — even overwhelming. While considered a dictator, his approval rating from locals stands at 91%.

Other Latin American leaders hope to adopt similar policies and have said that ‘he has accomplished a miracle’. Furthermore, crime rates have dramatically decreased from 51 per 100,000 in 2018 to 2.4 in 2022 since he adopted his new policies. This makes El Salvador the safest and most rapidly developing country in Latin America, as of today.

The country’s GDP per capita has also shown a promising increase between 2020, when it stood at US$4000, and 2023 ($5,400). A reason for the GDP increase can be explained by The Economist’s findings on how much gangs actually cost the economy of El Salvador. The total cost was said to be around 16% of the nation’s GDP, and it included the extra spending on security per household, bribes, and the loss of those who were deterred from working.

At first glance, this all seems to be a huge turnaround for the living standards in the country as well as its overall development. However, keeping 1% of the population imprisoned is bound to come with adverse and hidden costs to the country. Firstly, this came at a high cost for human rights. There were reports of the wrongful arrests of minors and adults alike, as well as reports of mistreatment and unexplained deaths of prisoners in the custody of the mass prisons.

Furthermore, there have been concerns about the country’s democratic backsliding and the lack of protection against the government’s abuse of power over its people. It’s also important to note that under Bukele’s economy, the country is experiencing higher levels of extreme poverty and increased inflation. The president inherited a weak economy and a state controlled by gangs. It’s expected that growth won’t be linear due to uneven development, but what is the right price for safety?

Bottom Line: El Salvador has become far safer and the economy has grown under Bukele, but that progress is undermined by weakening human rights and a lack of fundamental economic reforms. How long will the Bukele boom last?

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* Please help my Real Donut Economics** students by commenting on unclear analysis, alternative perspectives, better data sources, or maybe just saying something nice 🙂

** Why “Real”? In short, because (a) Raworth’s claims to being a “21st century economist” denies that all of her ideas were presented by others in the 20th century and (b) she presents no viable mechanisms (besides “be nice”) for achieving equality and sustainability. My students are more realistic. In long? Read this.

Števo writes*

Every adult who enters their first full-time job quickly understands that time is our most important asset. Weekends always seem short, rest is rare, and work suddenly devours a massive part of our life. In 1930, John Maynard Keynes predicted a fifteen-hour workweek by 2030. That result would release us from these pressures, but it does not seem likely.

That said, the ±40-hour workweek has become the norm in many countries, and average yearly working hours are falling. On the other hand, this trend has stagnated or completely halted for full-time workers in many western countries over the last 40 years.

Instead of more leisure time, citizens embrace consumerism, politicians strive to grow GDP, and “being busy“ has become a status symbol of the higher classes. Today, with sustainability at the forefront of many political discussions, some are exploring the possibility of a shorter workweek as a solution to both lowering out footprint on the planet while also freeing more time for ourselves. Some studies show that countries and households with longer working hours have larger climate footprints, but would decreasing our work time really deliver sustainability?

There are many caveats and possible ways to reduce working hours. If there is a top-down decrease in the working week, for example through a four-day workweek, shorter workday or more vacation days, it is important whether the wage will stay constant or decrease proportionally. If it were lowered, people would be forced to consume less, in theory decreasing production and our material footprint; but less income is also associated with austerity, which would hurt “precariats” who are already economically struggling. If salary stays the same, then the environmental impact would depend on people’s use of their leisure time.  Would they spend it cooking organic meals at home, or on more fast food or on a holiday in the Maldives?

Another option to reduce working hours would involve taxes that would internalize the negative externalities (spill over costs) from unsustainable consumption. The resulting higher prices would lower consumption and thus production, which would decrease working hours or even increase unemployment.

A third option would combine government support for better work-life balance with a revolution in social norms, so that people decided to both work and consume less.

Even if we could get lower production without harming the poor and a sustainable use of extra leisure time, there’s still another problem: fossil fuels. Cheap fossil fuels have really boosted productivity and efficiency in our economy. In a post-fossil world, certain sectors would need more work, i.e., “what capital will no longer do, humans will have to do.”

Bottom Line: Working less would reduce environmental stress, but it’s hard to see how to reduce working hours without big changes in social norms, lifestyles and preferences.

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* Please help my Real Donut Economics** students by commenting on unclear analysis, alternative perspectives, better data sources, or maybe just saying something nice 🙂

** Why “Real”? In short, because (a) Raworth’s claims to being a “21st century economist” denies that all of her ideas were presented by others in the 20th century and (b) she presents no viable mechanisms (besides “be nice”) for achieving equality and sustainability. My students are more realistic. In long? Read this.

Ayala writes*

When I first started to read about Thailand’s “Sufficiency Economy Policy (SEP), I thought they had figured it out. It seems ideal. The SEP addresses a key problem — overconsumption — and emphasizes the importance of finding a middle path of self-reliance. It stands on the principles of moderation, reasonableness, and self-immunity, and does so by interacting with economic and development activities from the individual level to the community and national ones (Piboolsravut, 2004).

More specifically, the SEP encourages grassroot contributions to local, sustainable development (Schaffar, 2018). This for example can be seen from Naipinit et. al.‘s case study of how the SEP was implemented in four Thai villages. According to it, 80% of the villagers surveyed responded that they grow food solely for their own consumption, reflecting the concept of resilience that is integral to the policy. Moreover, by saving money on buying luxury goods, they can invest in protections from different crisis. It was also shown that in these villages’ social networks are strong and that locals work together to benefit their own community, resulting in both high-level products and in increased well-being (Naipinit et. al., 2014).

It is important to note that much of the SEP’s success can be attributed to its alignment with Thai informal institutions that build on Buddhism. The idea of sustainability in Buddhism involves the interconnectedness of the economy, society, and the environment (Song, 2020). This cultural link means that local institutions help support the SEP.

On the other hand, I found some criticism of the SEP. Schaffar suggested that the SEP has recently been used to justify Thailand’s dictatorship. The regime has gained its legitimacy by leading innovative development ideas, including the sufficiency economy and their commitment to the SDGs. They argue that their control stabilizes the economy (Schaffar, 2018). Moreover, it seems that much of the burden of living a sufficient lifestyle is directed towards the poorer populations, which are already living off quite minimal consumption (Elinoff, 2014).

Bottom line: I am no longer convinced that Thailand’s Sufficiency Economy Policy is a success story, but it does represent a step in the right direction.

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* Please help my Real Donut Economics** students by commenting on unclear analysis, alternative perspectives, better data sources, or maybe just saying something nice 🙂

** Why “Real”? In short, because (a) Raworth’s claims to being a “21st century economist” denies that all of her ideas were presented by others in the 20th century and (b) she presents no viable mechanisms (besides “be nice”) for achieving equality and sustainability. My students are more realistic. In long? Read this.

Dominika writes*

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* Please help my Real Donut Economics** students by commenting on unclear analysis, alternative perspectives, better data sources, or maybe just saying something nice 🙂

** Why “Real”? In short, because (a) Raworth’s claims to being a “21st century economist” denies that all of her ideas were presented by others in the 20th century and (b) she presents no viable mechanisms (besides “be nice”) for achieving equality and sustainability. My students are more realistic. In long? Read this.

Nathan writes*

France’s prosperity during the 18th century was mainly fueled by the colonial triangular trade. It was a vast trading system that linked Europe, Africa, and the French Antilles. One could argue that economists such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo based their concepts of “absolute advantage” and “comparative advantage” on this system. It is however important to emphasize the fact that it was built on a foundation of human exploitation, a reality that cannot be overlooked.

This system was self-sustaining: French merchants brought textiles, alcohol, and weapons to Africa, where they bought enslaved people to transport to the French Antilles, where they were traded for sugar, coffee, cotton, and tobacco, which was then brought back for sale on the Continent. Then the cycle began again.

France therefore linked three distinct markets with different demands for manufactured goods, labor, and commodities. Each part of the world specialized. Thanks to “low marginal costs” (slaves), French ports greatly expanded and industrialized. Those ports then built more and better ships, which increased trade flows even further, reinforcing the gains from trade. At the same time, the entire French economy flourished costs fell and colonial demand increased. The state and monarchy collected greater tax and tariff revenues at home and in its colonies. It is important to note a lot of this revenue supported lavish aristocratic lifestyles rather than the common French citizen, which led to problems later.

France’s financial sector also developed during this period. Transatlantic trading was risky; many ships sank. Banking and insurance companies flourished in Paris and the port cities as companies sought to reduce the risks of sinking vessels, spoiled goods and the death and diseases that struck the crew and slaves during transport. Financial market became more sophisticated.

These developments did not, however, affect everyone. As stated above, tax revenues were not used to develop the country; they only benefitted the richest bourgeoisie, nobles and merchants. The majority of the population  — rural, farmers — faced deeper social inequalities. This should go without saying, but this trade also happened at a great ethical and human cost considering how people were enslaved and treated.

Bottom Line: France’s triangular trade helped it become a global economic power in the 18th century. It fueled urban growth, strengthened industries, expanded financial networks, and led to strong institutions regulating and insuring trade. On the other hand, it left a lasting legacy of exploitation and inequality. Its consequences can still be seen in France’s economic and social structure and the social and economic problems in its ex-colonies.

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* Please help my Real Donut Economics** students by commenting on unclear analysis, alternative perspectives, better data sources, or maybe just saying something nice 🙂

** Why “Real”? In short, because (a) Raworth’s claims to being a “21st century economist” denies that all of her ideas were presented by others in the 20th century and (b) she presents no viable mechanisms (besides “be nice”) for achieving equality and sustainability. My students are more realistic. In long? Read this.

Arı writes*

Global security requires collective action. The security dilemmas that realist international relation theorists emphasize are essentially cases of more complex prisoner’s dilemmas, i.e., a “common security” where one state’s security depends on both friends and foes. In simpler words, “I cannot feel secure if my neighbor or my enemy feels insecure.” This definition contradicts the realist idea of security as a zero sum game, which also means that collective action can produce a win-win outcome. Sadly, this common security approach ignores the profits of war.

Revenues from the top 100 arms firms totaled $632 billion in 2023. These revenues belong to private military companies situated around the world who have no interest in maintaining global security but every incentive to promote conflict.

The companies that profit from war also lobby for state policies that increase arms sales. For example, in the US, private military companies have spent $2.5 billion on lobbying and $285 million on election campaigns in the past two decades. Most of these lobbyists have occupied powerful positions in the government from Pentagon to the White House. The arms companies’ back door to policy makers is against the best interest of  citizens and global security. Most US arms sales go to allies, such NATO members, which may not destabilize security, but sales to Philippines, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Nigeria fuel instability in conflict-prone regions.

Profiting from war also takes place in countries that are actively involved in conflicts, such as Russia and Israel. In 2023, the top two defense companies in Russia saw a 40% increase in their combined revenues that totaled $25.5 billion. Three arms companies in Israel sold $13.6 billion in weapons. These profits create incentives to sustain conflicts.

Bottom Line: As revenues grow, arms dealers have even more leverage to promote policies that increase instability, conflict and profits. Their free riding weakens global security and destroys the lives of people experiencing conflict.

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* Please help my Real Donut Economics** students by commenting on unclear analysis, alternative perspectives, better data sources, or maybe just saying something nice 🙂

** Why “Real”? In short, because (a) Raworth’s claims to being a “21st century economist” denies that all of her ideas were presented by others in the 20th century and (b) she presents no viable mechanisms (besides “be nice”) for achieving equality and sustainability. My students are more realistic. In long? Read this.

Sara writes*

Pittsburgh and Detroit, known as Rust Belt cities because of their proximity to areas of heavy manufacturing, were two of the wealthiest American cities in the 20th century (Warda, 2016). Yet today, while one city is said to be a model for re-emerging sustainable cities (Mewawalla, 2024), the other is referred to as the worst case of urban decay in US history (Warda, 2016). The cities have comparable origins, and both attribute their wealth to specialisation, so what has led them down such different trajectories? What went wrong? Or perhaps more importantly, what went right?

Pittsburgh grew in the 1900s due to its favourable location at the confluence of two rivers, making it a unique trading hub with access to the Atlantic coast and the Midwest (Wikipedia, 2025). Eventually, thanks to Andrew Carniege, Pittsburgh became the “Steel City”, home to U.S. Steel, and produced close to half of America’s steel at the time (Mewawalla, 2024). However, as the city experienced deindustrialisation in the 90s, Pittsburgh was forced to diversify (Wikipedia, 2025).

Detroit, on the other hand, specialised in the automotive industry in the early 20th century and became known as the “Motor City” (Briscoe, 2024), home to the “Big Three” of car manufacturers, General Motors, Ford and Chrysler (Wikipedia, 2025). However, faced with foreign competition in the 50s and 60s, car manufacturers began relocating their factories to minimise production costs, while up and comers gained market share (Warda, 2016). Meanwhile, being the most segregated city in America from the 50s to the 70s, racial tensions contributed to declining social cohesion in Detroit (Briscoe, 2024).

So how have the Rust Belt cities fared, since being confronted with the dilemma of diversification? Put simply, only one managed to diversify in time. The Steel City diversified, becoming a frontrunner in health care, education and AI (Wikipedia, 2025) while embracing its “industrial heritage” (CityTalk, 2017) and modelling partnerships between the public and private sector (Fineman, 2010). In fact, Pittsburgh enjoys the title of being one of the most liveable cities in the US (Wince-Smith, 2014). Contrastingly, the Motor City, having failed to diversify in time, lags behind. The decline of the automotive industry induced high levels of unemployment and emigration (Briscoe, 2024), leading to a 61.4% decrease in the city’s population from the 1950 to 2010 and hence, a declining tax base (ELGP, n.d.). These factors, among others, contributed to the city having to declare an 18 billion USD bankruptcy in 2013 (Briscoe, 2024).

Since then, Pittsburgh has continued to grow as a hub for high-tech innovation (Wince-Smith, 2014), but Detroit’s rebirth is also on the horizon, with its population having grown for the first time in 66 years in 2023 (Harding, 2024). Still, urban renewal has been slow, as investment has flowed primarily from the private sector (Ager, n.d.), been limited to downtown (ELGP, n.d.), and revitalisation programs do not effectively represent the needs of the most vulnerable populations (Hill, n.d.).

So how could the present prosperity of two historically similar cities be reconciled? Can Detroit learn from Pittsburgh’s success?

Bottom line: Economic diversification exhibits a make-or-break point for the economies of Pittsburgh and Detroit, while other factors like the balance between public and private investment, and the cities’ ability to encourage entrepreneurship contribute to their successes in revitalisation.

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* Please help my Real Donut Economics** students by commenting on unclear analysis, alternative perspectives, better data sources, or maybe just saying something nice 🙂

** Why “Real”? In short, because (a) Raworth’s claims to being a “21st century economist” denies that all of her ideas were presented by others in the 20th century and (b) she presents no viable mechanisms (besides “be nice”) for achieving equality and sustainability. My students are more realistic. In long? Read this.

Emil writes*

Today everybody talks about AI and many students use large language models (LLMs) such as ChatGPT. The wide-scale release of LLMs and generative AI has spurred the public discourse about the impacts of AI on society and especially on how AI might threaten democracy.

AI-generated synthetic content is flooding the public arena with false or misleading information. One infamous example is Trump’s posting of a fake image of Taylor Swift endorsing his election campaign. But generated content is only one example of how AI is threatening our democratic institutions. It is also expected to heavily disrupt the labour market, shift the balance between autocracies and democracies, and enable mass surveillance on unprecedented scales.

One of the core issues is that the speed and scale of new AI tools greatly outpaces governmental oversight and society’s ability to manage the consequences. To better assess the impacts of AI on democracy, let’s turn to Jungherr’s conceptual framework.

The definition of democracy itself might be contested, but it surely involves the idea of a government by the people and for the people. Democratic institutions are supposed to act on behalf of the people through different forms of electoral power delegation. Some people might be representatives, but the overall system is supposed to take everybody (or all eligible members of a state) equally into account.

Based on this, 4 different levels can be identified on which AI exerts different kinds of impact:

On the individual level, AI impacts both the ability of people to self-rule and the idea that self-rule is superior to other forms of decision-making processes. Self-rule here refers to the normative idea that all individuals govern themselves together without external interventions. A society without self-rule would for example be a dictator or Plato’s philosopher kings. The legitimacy of self-rule roots itself in the idea that the individual citizens can make informed decisions for themselves and their respective communities. This idea can be questioned in both directions by AI development. On one side, AI systems can lower the threshold to information access. On the other hand, AI-generated content can interfere with informed decision making. AI thus directly affects the informational foundations of self-rule. Beyond this rapid AI development might lead people to question if self-rule is the best way to govern society.

On the group level, AI impacts equality. While in reality no democracy achieves true equality, it is nevertheless a very foundational ideal. AI systems can be (mis)trained to reproduce societal biases or create new ones. The availability and kind of data play a central role in this creation of biases. After all, only what was measured in the past can be extrapolated into the future. Beyond this, the labour market impacts of AI technology can greatly increase or decrease equality depending on how the gains through AI advancement will be distributed. Here economic inequality and subsequent political disadvantages go hand in hand.

On the institutional level, AI-fuelled misinformation plays again a big role. AI systems can influence elections like never before. With such powerful systems, a group of few can try to game the institutional system meant to represent the will of the people. Another threat of AI is that it could eliminate the public perception of uncertain election results. The idea here is that institutionally a certain uncertainty is needed so that parties compete genuinely and that the public trusts the electoral process.

Lastly, on the system level, AI can reshuffle the relationship between democratic systems and other systems of governance. Here considerations about different possibilities of development and deployment of extensive AI systems matter greatly. AI can be integrated well into democracies and for example make democratic bureaucracies more efficient. However, autocratic systems can benefit immensely from the greater leeway they have concerning the privacy rights of their citizens. Autocratic leaders can collect extensively all the data they want and then use AI systems to leverage this data to tighten their grip on power and control.

Bottom Line: AI development will disrupt and impact democracy in many ways. To study these impacts is therefore vital. Untangling the different dimensions of this impact is a first and essential step for future research towards a better understanding of AI’s impact on democracy.

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* Please help my Real Donut Economics** students by commenting on unclear analysis, alternative perspectives, better data sources, or maybe just saying something nice 🙂

** Why “Real”? In short, because (a) Raworth’s claims to being a “21st century economist” denies that all of her ideas were presented by others in the 20th century and (b) she presents no viable mechanisms (besides “be nice”) for achieving equality and sustainability. My students are more realistic. In long? Read this.

Bente writes*

Income inequality in the Netherlands in 2017 was around 0.55, as measured by the Gini coefficient (CBS). However, the Netherlands implemented many policies to reduce this income inequality such as a progressive tax system and unemployment benefits. As a result, after taxes and benefits, the Gini coefficient for disposable income is only 0.29 (CBS). This shows the effectiveness of policies in the Netherlands to reduce income inequality. However, this is not yet the case for capital inequality in the Netherlands as the Gini coefficient for capital [a subset of wealth] was 0.79 in the Netherlands in 2017 (CPB) — a troubling figure that needs to be reduced.

Currently, households with more capital have a higher chance of getting an inheritance (Centraal Planbureau). In the Netherlands, the 10% highest capital owners receive 35% of gifts and 26% of inheritances, and they own 63% of net capital (Centraal Planbureau). Inheritance taxes start at 10% for the deceased’s partner and children and rise to 18% for other family members, on amounts below €154,000. Above that sum, the tax is 20% (belastingsdienst erfbelasting).

The average inheritance tax in 2015 was around 12%; the average on gifts was only 6% (Centraal Planbureau). Compare those figures to the lowest income tax: roughly 36% on incomes up to €38,000 (Belastingdienst inkomstenbelasting). This disparity shows the effort the Netherlands made to reduce income inequality, and how comparatively little has been done to mitigate capital inequality. In the Netherlands, only 0,51% of tax revenues come from inheritance taxes.

The inheritance tax must rise to reduce capital inequality (Geron), but such increases are not politically popular. Many citizens view inheritance taxes as an unfair double taxation, so politicians avoid them to protect their votes.

Action is needed to increase the inheritance tax in the Netherlands, to reduce capital inequality and possibly reduce wealth inequality. Wealth inequality remains higher than income inequality. Increased inheritance tax might reduce wealth inequality by creating a more balanced distribution of capital and wealth over generations (CPB). However, in the literature, a consensus has not been reached on whether inheritance increases or decreases wealth inequality (Elinder). This also results in discussions on the possible impact of increasing the inheritance tax (Elinder). In the Netherlands, research showed that inheritance did not cause an increase in wealth inequality between 2007 and 2015 (Centraal planbureau). This was because large inheritances were given from older wealthy people to less wealthy generations (Centraal planbureau). Furthermore, although lower-wealth households receive smaller inheritances, these inheritances represent a relatively higher increase in wealth for the lower-wealth households (Centraal planbureau vermogensongelijkheid). Considering these findings, the key question remains whether increasing the inheritance tax will help decrease wealth inequality in the Netherlands.

Bottom line: Higher inheritance taxes will reduce capital inequality in the Netherlands. Further research is needed to see if they will also reduce wealth inequality.

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* Please help my Real Donut Economics** students by commenting on unclear analysis, alternative perspectives, better data sources, or maybe just saying something nice 🙂

** Why “Real”? In short, because (a) Raworth’s claims to being a “21st century economist” denies that all of her ideas were presented by others in the 20th century and (b) she presents no viable mechanisms (besides “be nice”) for achieving equality and sustainability. My students are more realistic. In long? Read this.

Philippine writes*

In 2018, France replaced the Impôt de Solidarité sur la Fortune (ISF) with the Impôt sur la Fortune Immobilière (IFI), significantly altering the taxation of wealth (Service-Public, 2025). While it is too early to assess the environmental impact of such a taxation amendment in statistical terms, I argue that the reform’s changes in incentives are likely to lead to detrimental environmental consequences.

Increased financial investments, more emissions
The ISF previously taxed both financial and real estate assets, while the IFI only applies to real estate holdings (Bach, 2021). This shift incentivized wealthy individuals to move their investments from real estate to financial assets – many of which support high-emission industries – or move their investments to mobile polluting assets such as yachts (Bonneau, 2020). However, the CO2 emissions related to the financial assets of the wealthiest already have a massive environmental impact. A report revealed that the combined wealth of 63 French billionaires generates as much CO2 as 50% of the country’s population due to their investments in polluting industries (Oxfam, 2023). Accordingly, by eliminating taxation on financial wealth, the state is eliminating barriers for the wealthiest to allocate their capital to high-emission sectors, further exacerbating climate change.

Decreased real estate sustainable investments, more emissions
Furthermore, by taxing real estate more heavily than financial assets, the IFI is expected to discourage investment in the renovation and insulation of buildings (Bonneau, 2020). This, in turn, could slow critical efforts to reduce energy waste and lower carbon emissions. (Bonneau, 2020). The government justified the shift from the ISF to the IFI by arguing that taxing financial wealth less would stimulate economic growth. However, in practice, this change has disincentivized sustainable investments in real estate, further delaying necessary environmental adaptations in the housing sector.

Reduced fiscal resources for green transition
Beyond shifting investments toward carbon-intensive industries, the transition from ISF to IFI also resulted in a significant loss of government revenue. These losses are estimated to exceed 5 billion euros by Thomas Piketty. This drastic reduction in tax revenue also means fewer public funds available for financing the green transition. A report commissioned by the French Prime Minister in May 2023 estimated that achieving the country’s net-zero emissions goals would require approximately €70 billion by 2030 (France Stratégie, 2023). While the direct causal link between the tax reform and decreased environmental funding is complex, the reduction in fiscal capacity due to the tax reform should make it more challenging to secure the necessary public investment to embrace Green Transition effectively.
A proposed solution to counter these challenges is a climate wealth tax, which would consider both wealth level and carbon footprint to determine taxation (Oxfam, 2023). This approach could incentivize wealthy individuals to decarbonize their financial portfolios, steering investments toward greener assets.

Bottom Line: From an environmental perspective, the shift from the ISF to the IFI should have severe negative consequences. By favoring financial investments over real estate, it has increased capital flows into high-emission industries, discouraged sustainable housing investments, and reduced government funding for climate initiatives.

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* Please help my Real Donut Economics** students by commenting on unclear analysis, alternative perspectives, better data sources, or maybe just saying something nice 🙂

** Why “Real”? In short, because (a) Raworth’s claims to being a “21st century economist” denies that all of her ideas were presented by others in the 20th century and (b) she presents no viable mechanisms (besides “be nice”) for achieving equality and sustainability. My students are more realistic. In long? Read this.