Andre writes*
The Royal Thai Army is notorious for regularly overthrowing governments, elected or otherwise. The most recent coup took place in May 2014, when the milItary removed the Shinawatra-led government supported by the ‘Red Shirts.’ Since a 1932 coup established the constitutional monarchy that continues to exist today, Thailand has undergone eleven successful coups and experiences an attempted coup every seven years (The Straits Times 2014; The Atlantic 2019)
Why does the army continue to overthrow governments?
There are several theories on preventing coups:
- There must be a normative understanding that the military should stay out of politics.
- The existence of strong non-military organisations (civil society) is a way for society to counter-balance military power.
- Institutional arrangements (constitutional design) are aimed at preventing coups.
In Thailand, the frequent coups are a symptom of an underlying and long-running divide between the rural periphery and the royalist-urban middle class centred around Bangkok. They are commonly known as ‘Red Shirts’ and ‘Yellow Shirts’ respectively, which are the colors used in their demonstrations. The conflict within Thailand’s society is central to giving the military a key role in politics.
First, past coups set a clear precedent for further coups, and Thailand holds the world record. Coups are so frequent that they are nothing special. Indeed, the establishment of the constitutional monarchy through military coup gives the military a claim to being part of the internal political order. It is even expected of the military to intervene in political crises (CNBC 2019).
Second, the divide is so strong that the Yellow Shirts have supported what they term ‘pro-democracy’ military coups. This has ensured their position of political and economic privilege while the Red Shirts, on Thailand’s rural periphery, face repression by the military (The Atlantic 2019).
Third, Yellow Shirt civil societies play an important role in supporting and legitimising coups (The Atlantic 2019). Points 1 and 2 of coup-proofing theories are thus negated by a lack of normative agreement that the military should refrain from intervening in politics. The military has thus used the support for its coups to change institutional arrangements in its favour. Currently, the Thai parliament consists of an elected House of Representatives and a Senate. The 250 members of the Senate are chosen by the junta and their consent is required to choose the Prime Minister (The Atlantic 2019).
Fourth, royal support is critical to the success of coups, as the king is revered by Thais. In the past two coups (of 2006 and 2014), the junta was given public support by the king. This legitimacy was arguably key to coup success. In comparison, a coup attempt in 1981 failed as the king supported the incumbent Prime Minister (The Atlantic 2019).
Bottom Line: Thailand’s transition to democracy –despite frequent post-coup elections (which despite being unfair have resulted in anti-coup parties winning) — is ongoing. The difficulty in transitioning to full democracy could be explained by how popular democracy is not in the interest of Thailand’s elites. These consist of the military, the middle class and royalists, who are centred on Bangkok and hold significant economic power – the top 1% hold two thirds of the country’s wealth (Khaosod 2019). Unsurprisingly, these economic elites are unwilling to lose their economic rents and privileges to a government interested in redistribution to the periphery. Without creating an inclusive political system that benefits elites and non-elites, the equilibrium of military rule, or military-influenced rule is likely to continue.
* Please help my Economic Growth & Development students by commenting on unclear analysis, alternative perspectives, better data sources, or maybe just saying something nice :).