Pierre writes*
“Neglected. Expensive. Embarrassing.” Those three words are too often associated with American passenger rail services. Plagued by aging infrastructure and chronic underinvestment, passenger services seem to have a patent on inefficiency, inconsistency, and discouraging ridership.
Against this backdrop, it should come as no surprise that Amtrak (the American equivalent to the Dutch NS) has failed to turn a profit since its nationalization in 1971 (WBUR, 2020). This is the reality of a passenger rail system that fails to offer the speed, reliability, and convenience necessary to compete with other modes of transportation in the country.
Dismal levels of state and federal transportation funding has prompted an increased reliance on private sector partners to finance, construct, and ameliorate infrastructure.
Heralded as the first privately-owned and operated rail line built in the last decade, the Brightline Florida project seems promising. Inaugurated in late 2017, Brightline experienced a 67% ridership increase and a revenue jump of 174% in 2023 compared to the prior year, slightly reducing cars’ 99% share of long-distance travel in the state (Trains, 2024; Braun, 2024).
The Brightline business model focusses on transit orientated development (TOD) (Schorung, 2022). Investments into real estate developments complement its transportation offerings, enhances overall customer experience, and encourages the growth of walkable neighborhoods centered around transit hubs. It is too often the case in the United States that railway stations are located far from city centers and residential areas, which means, ironically, that stations need large parking areas for riders.
For Brightline, Miami, Fort Lauderdale, and West Palm Beach represent essential pillars for its property and real estate strategy. MiamiCentral station’s urbanization operation, for example, includes “the train terminal, which will house three rail services (Brightline, Metrorail, Metromover), a sizeable commercial center, two high-rise residential blocks and two 30-story office buildings — 2MiamiCentral and 3Miamicentral” (Schorung, 2022). As a whole, the initiative will create “around 93,000m2 of professional and commercial spaces, along with 1,300 new residential units” (Schorung, 2022).
Bottom Line: Brightline is not just diversifying its revenue sources, its TOD strategy is fosters sustainable urban growth, reduced social inequity, improved road safety, and increased city efficiency (ITDP, 2024).
* Please help my Real Donut Economics** students by commenting on unclear analysis, alternative perspectives, better data sources, or maybe just saying something nice 🙂
** Why “Real”? In short, because (a) Raworth’s claims to being a “21st century economist” denies that all of her ideas were presented by others in the 20th century and (b) she presents no viable mechanisms (besides “be nice”) for achieving equality and sustainability. My students are more realistic. In long? Read this.
I see you have compared Amtrak to NS, and this made me wonder about the impact of the American culture- they LOVE cars. Maybe it’s even more difficult to convince people to take the train in a country where your sweet sixteen presents is a car and the culture is to treat it like your baby. The Deutsche Bahn system in Germany is very bad when it comes to a lot of the variables you are considering- cost, efficiency, and frequency and magnitude of delays, and yet the trains are still full.
Also after reading this it did feel very pro-Brightline, even though they seem to be a great improvement I would take a look at why it has taken so long for this to happen. Why have past attempts such as the Desert XPress train from Las Vegas to San Bernardin failed and how is Brightline different?
Hi Anna, thank you for your comment. I think the reason why a private rail project like Brightline took so long to materialize comes down to three factors: infrastructure development, market analysis/planning, and public opposition (lobbying + environmental, property concerns etc.). With regards to your second question, the Desert Xpress project was acquired by Brightline’s parent company in 2018 and is now called ‘Brightline West’. It aims to succeed, in light of growing market demand and political/regulatory support, where the former failed. Construction broke ground on April 22nd 2024, making Brightline West the United State’s first ‘true’ high speed rail system. Revenue service is set to commence in 2028, with the line slated to open in tandem with the LA28 Olympic Games.
Hi Pierre!
I reallly enjoyed reading your post! I always found railway investments a super interesting topic, especially the megaprojects. In the blogpost you mention that one of the reasons of Amtrak’s failure is low funding of train infrastructure. However, I remember watching a video about how most of US railroads are owned by a few private freight companies, and how cargo trains have priority over passenger trains there. Would you agree this could be another reason for Amtrak’s (and American passenger rail’s in general) failure? Maybe if this problem was resolved, there would be no need to build new railroad lines, because the existing ones could be used more efficiently?
Feel free to correct me on this if I’m wrong!
Cheers,
Tomek
Thank you for your comment Tomek. Most of the track Amtrak operates on is indeed owned by a handful of freight companies which have precedence over passenger rail. This translates to higher operating costs and service disruptions that deter away from train travel (expensive tickets, delays).