Category: Guest post

Hong Kong’s costly housing

Jasmine writes*

For 12 years, Hong Kong has been ranked as the world’s most unaffordable city (Delmendo, 2024).  We often hear that this is due to a land shortage, but is that really the reason? In Hong Kong, only 3.7% of the land is zoned for urban housing (Four Facades, 2020). Though rocky terrain is unsuitable for building, there is still a lot of other space. The issue is not a shortage of land, but poor management (Vox, 2018).

Much of Hong Kong’s economic success is credited to low taxes, but low tax revenues force the government to rely more on land sales: Between 19% and 27% of the government’s revenues came from leasing land in 2016 to 2019 (OECD, n.d.).

The government owns all of Hong Kong’s land, which it leases to developers in auctions that set crazy prices, like 20.8 billion HKD to lease 48,000 square meters of land (USD 55,000/m2) for 50 years. Those high prices mean that developers must charge insane prices for tiny rooms (Arcibal, 2021).

This system generates revenue for the government, but it lowers  Hongkongers’ living standards. A median-priced apartment costs 20 times median household’s gross income  (Wong, 2022).

To tackle this problem, Hong Kong needs to free up more space, but those big auction earnings — which are only justified when housing prices are high — make change unlikely. A senior governor official said that “the sheer size of interest groups in Hong Kong is the root of the problem” (Caixin Global, 2021).

Bottom Line: Hong Kong’s housing problem stems not from land scarcity but from an economic dependence on property sales for revenue, which works to control the city’s politics.

* Please help my Real Donut Economics** students by commenting on unclear analysis, alternative perspectives, better data sources, or maybe just saying something nice 🙂

** Why “Real”? In short, because (a) Raworth’s claims to being a “21st century economist” denies that all of her ideas were presented by others in the 20th century and (b) she presents no viable mechanisms (besides “be nice”) for achieving equality and sustainability. My students are more realistic. In long? Read this.

Progress in post-communist Europe

Tomek writes*

Following the fall of Communism and the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, 15 new countries appeared on the world map. Russia, Ukraine, the Baltic states, and the rest joined freshly independent post-communist countries (including Poland, East Germany, and Romania) in transforming from centrally-planned to free-market economies.

Previously bound by a single administration, each state could go its own way. Some of them ended up as relatively healthy democracies (e.g., the Baltic states), some as flawed democracies (e.g., Ukraine), and some as autocratic/totalitarian regimes (e.g., Belarus, Russia). Their development also varied greatly, resulting in vast differences. In 2023, PPP-adjusted GDP per capita of the post-Soviet European countries ranged from 13,901 USD for Ukraine to 49,266 USD for Lithuania (International Monetary Fund). In 2021, the HDI index for these countries ranged from 0.759 for Moldova to 0.890 for Estonia (United Nations Development Programme, 2022).

It would be tempting to attribute these differences solely to historical factors. However, as a report by the World Bank reveals, there are surprising variations among countries with similar economic starting points. For instance, Moldova’s economy stagnated after the implementation of economic reforms, and Armenia’s nearly doubled, even though both suffered a similar initial drop after the transformation.

The report’s authors identified multiple alternative explanations, but some are particularly interesting. First, the speed of the transition matters. Countries where the reforms were implemented quickly (in the form of “shock therapy”), were generally better off than those where the process stretched over a longer time. This might seem counterintuitive – more incremental reforms give policymakers more time to react to unplanned outcomes. However, as the authors show, well-prepared “shock policies” let countries reap their benefits quicker, which lead to a quicker recovery from the initial drop.

However, not only does the speed of the transition matter but so does its extent. As the authors claim, simultaneously promoting growth in new sectors and protecting the old ones is impossible. Growth was significantly weaker in countries where private firms lacked access to loans (loans went to state enterprises), which hindered new firms from entering the market and disrupting the inefficient status quo. In Belarus, for example, private companies comprise only 26% of the market — significantly less than the Commonwealth of Independent States average. Economic transformation was also delayed by other “bumps” in the playing field, such as allowing inefficient state companies to delay paying for energy and covering the resulting losses by raising prices to private companies.

Bottom Line: Quick and extensive reforms in post-Soviet states have been more efficient and less costly in the long term than long and partial reforms. Those countries that implemented “shock policies” suffered a lot initially but then grew more quickly. Countries that moved more slowly stagnated without realizing their potential.

* Please help my Real Donut Economics** students by commenting on unclear analysis, alternative perspectives, better data sources, or maybe just saying something nice 🙂

** Why “Real”? In short, because (a) Raworth’s claims to being a “21st century economist” denies that all of her ideas were presented by others in the 20th century and (b) she presents no viable mechanisms (besides “be nice”) for achieving equality and sustainability. My students are more realistic. In long? Read this.

The perils of the Kopili dam

Madeeha writes*

Established in 1976 and operational since 1984, the Kopili hydropower plant represents the inaugural venture by a public sector unit in Assam. Generating a total of 275 megawatts, with 150 megawatts designated for households, the power plant comprises two concrete structures: the 30-meter Kopili dam, located over the Umrang River, a tributary of the Kopili River in Umrangso, and the 66-meter Khandong dam situated on the Kopili River itself (Wire, 2019). The Kopili Project is under the Northeastern Electric Power Corporation Limited (NEEPCO) which is a public sector of the Ministry of Power under the Government of India.

While the Kopili Hydroelectric Power plant (HEP) has notable successes, such as providing electricity and causing fewer emissions than fossil fuels in northeast India, it faces significant challenges stemming from the construction of the two dams. Himanshu Thakkar (2010) writes that dams have increased the frequency of floods from 2-3 times a year to 5-6 times a year. Additionally, due to dam-induced floods in 2004, 192,000 people in Assam were temporarily displaced, and four people lost their lives (Saikia, 2013).

As the Kopili River’s water is used to generate electricity, the water quality of the river plays a huge role in maintaining the functionality of the Kopili HEP. In 2019, strong acids in the slurry ate away at the pipe meant to carry water at a rate of 12,000 litres per second (Akhtar, 2019).  This caused the pipe to burst, which swept four people to their death. Unfortunately, the lives lost cannot be compensated, and the blame game between different stakeholders doesn’t help either.

V.K. Singh, the head of NEEPCO, holds the acidic water responsible and states that the governments of Meghalaya and Assam had ignored the warnings of the water in Kopili river turning acidic (Akhtar, 2019). On the other hand, the political party Congress, which was in power before 2014, holds the Bharatiya Janata Party responsible for mishandling $28 million in maintenance work that Congress had approved when they were in power (Akhtar, 2019). If the blame game wasn’t enough, the legality of rat-hole mining which makes Kopili River acidic makes accountability on a state and local level even more difficult. NEEPCO blames the state of Meghalaya for allowing rat-hole mining despite the ban from India’s National Green Tribunal Court (NGT). The local community in Meghalaya argues that they have special rights under the constitution and the freedom to use the land they own according to their own needs. Additionally, mining using child labour continues with no environmental impact assessment being held, which was made compulsory in 2006 under the 1986 Environment Protection Act (Akhtar, 2019).

However, most independent experts have agreed that NEEPCO shouldn’t continue the usage of the Kopili HEP knowing the effect of acidic water on its pipes and must be held responsible for the damage it has caused (Akhtar, 2019).

Bottom Line: The Kopili Project has incurred significant costs for the country, both in terms of finances and lives lost. The environmental consequences, which are difficult to fully quantify, are bound to worsen over time. Therefore, urgent repairs are needed for the power plant, and similar projects should be halted until the issues are addressed.

* Please help my Real Donut Economics** students by commenting on unclear analysis, alternative perspectives, better data sources, or maybe just saying something nice 🙂

** Why “Real”? In short, because (a) Raworth’s claims to being a “21st century economist” denies that all of her ideas were presented by others in the 20th century and (b) she presents no viable mechanisms (besides “be nice”) for achieving equality and sustainability. My students are more realistic. In long? Read this.

How to school the poorest?

Filip writes*

In the past two decades, there has been a dispute over the most effective ways to educate children in low-income countries and remote areas.

One side of the barricade argues for traditional methods of educational quality, such as hiring more external teachers, buying more textbooks, and providing flexible grants (Kremer et. al. 2013).

On the other side, research using randomized trials finds that schooling is cost sensitive, which recommends hiring local teachers on short term contracts and using technology such as iPads or laptops to improve in-person and remote schooling outcomes. Information and Communication Technology (ICT) can deliver effective at-home learning (Kamer et. al.2013).

ICT can make learning in developing countries more efficient, for two main reasons. First, due to the limited resources, children of different ages and levels of education must share one classroom, making it impossible for each child’s needs to be accommodated. Second, schools in remote areas and low-income countries often have too few teachers. ICT can replace less effective, one-size-fits-all teaching with more intense personalized learning. ICT can also deliver learning in remote areas, saving the cost of building schools and improving delivery of quality teaching (Sife et. al. 2007).

Many schools in developing countries tried hiring additional teachers, but this costly approach did not bring proportional benefits (Glewwe et al. 2010). In Kenya, on the other hand, the government hired local teachers on short-term, seasonal contracts that were cheaper but also effective, in terms of learning outcomes (Krueger and Whitmore 2001; Banerjee 2007).

Bottom Line: The two most cost-effective strategies for improving learning outcomes in schools in low-income countries and remote areas is to hire local teachers on short term contracts and use more technology.

* Please help my Real Donut Economics** students by commenting on unclear analysis, alternative perspectives, better data sources, or maybe just saying something nice 🙂

** Why “Real”? In short, because (a) Raworth’s claims to being a “21st century economist” denies that all of her ideas were presented by others in the 20th century and (b) she presents no viable mechanisms (besides “be nice”) for achieving equality and sustainability. My students are more realistic. In long? Read this.

Nuclear – The energy of the past?

Nathan writes*

During the early development of civilian nuclear power, everything was promised. It would deliver cheap and abundant electricity to society, ending reliance on fossil fuels and eliminating pollution. Nuclear power, especially fusion (always 20 years away), was seen as the energy of the future and would even become too cheap to meter. Though this was always more hype than fact, the rapid build-up of nuclear power in France following the oil shock of 1973, delivered much on these promises. After OPEC quadrupled the price of oil effectively overnight, France embarked on the Messmer Plan to end its dependence on imported fuel. In 15 years, 48 reactors were deployed at 12 different plants around the country and by 1980, France had overtaken Germany. Though the plan originally called for 170 reactors to be built by 2000, three quarters of the electricity generation in France was already coming from only 50 reactors. Despite efforts by the EDF to stimulate demand, the expected increase failed to materialise, and supply had already surpassed it. As result, France’s nuclear plants operated only at around 60% capacity, something still common today in the summer, when demand is at its lowest.

Though important opposition to the plan had emerged in France, in Germany, where investment had been slower and capacity had lagged, support for a different type of energy system was rising. The movement for an ‘energiewende’ or energy transition, had already gained support after the oil shock and was inherently sceptical of nuclear power. Germany’s relatively decentralised federal system also made local protests against proposed plants more effective. As a result, by the time of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, the country was far from committed to nuclear power. Being far closer than France and more directly affected by the radiation spread west by the wind, Germany’s nuclear program effectively ended that year. Increasing backlash in France, particularly after Chernobyl, contributed to slowing investment in the 1990s. However, this was largely a result of the program’s own success, fossil fuels had already been almost eliminated from electricity production. More importantly, electricity use, and later, total energy use, had peaked in both countries.

The fate of Germany’s nuclear industry — in limbo since Chernobyl — was sealed by the 2011 Fukushima Daiichi disaster. It convinced even Angela Merkel, previously a supporter of nuclear power, to finally phase out German nuclear electricity by 2022. This accompanied significant investment into renewable energy sources, particularly wind, but also resulted in delaying significantly any possible phase out of fossil fuels, particularly coal and gas, pushing it to depend increasingly on imports from Russia.

In the meantime, in France, discussion was also swinging in favour of a phase out. The 2012 presidential election saw Holland, the eventual winner, support a partial move away from nuclear, aiming to lower its share to half electrical production by 2025, though it was never fully implemented. By 2020, France’s nuclear industry was badly in need of reinvestment: its youngest reactor was 18 years old and the average reactor was older than 34. The two decades of underinvestment seemed to finally come to a head in 2023, just as Germany, to the exasperation of some, finally closed its last reactor: in the midst of a painful energy crisis in Europe, as many as 26 of France’s aging reactors were force to shut down.

* Please help my Real Donut Economics** students by commenting on unclear analysis, alternative perspectives, better data sources, or maybe just saying something nice 🙂

** Why “Real”? In short, because (a) Raworth’s claims to being a “21st century economist” denies that all of her ideas were presented by others in the 20th century and (b) she presents no viable mechanisms (besides “be nice”) for achieving equality and sustainability. My students are more realistic. In long? Read this.

How Annecy’s Lake got so pure

Leo writes*

Annecy is a city in eastern France whose lake and vibrant colours attract tourists from all around the country. Boasting a modest population of around 120 000 people, Annecy is a small city with seemingly not many problems in regard to water (Wikipedia). The main attraction is its lake “Lac d’ Annecy.” Often called the blue lung of the region, Lac d’ Annecy helps with droughts and other water issues (Annecy Lake saves local ski station from drought).

This has not always been the case, as the lake’s water was not always so clean. In the last century, the lake was overwhelmed with water demand from growth in development and population (Barraqué, 1986).

When the lake’s water was initially used in 1908, water quality was good enough to forego treatment (Barraqué, 1986). But quality started to deteriorate in the “entre-deux-guerres” (interbellum) period (Barraqué, 1986), as waste waters were discharged into the lake (Le Dauphine). Numerous carnivorous fish species started to disappear — notably the famous Omble chevalier.

After the liberation of France in 1945, growing industry and tourism increased water demand as well as pollution (Barraqué, 1986).

It was only ten years later that the alarm was rung in face of the dire situation. Charles Bosson the maire of Annecy at the time, expedited the complete renovations of sewer systems and water treatment for all municipalities around the lake (Barraqué, 1986). A new syndicate was created in order to address water quality, the SILA (Intercommunal Syndicate of Annecy Lake) which still exists to this day (Le Dauphine).

A completely new system was designed: a collection belt around the lake brought waste water to Annecy for treatment. This solution, although more costly for Annecy spread the costs and benefits of the new system between the communes of the lake. For the scale of the town at the time, this construction was massive: 47km of collection pipes, 190 km of new sewer pipes and a new purification facility (Barraqué, 1986). All for 2,275 billion French francs or the equivalent of 350 million euros today (Le Dauphine). With the system’s completion in 1976, water quality improved (Le Dauphine). Today, Lake Annecy has a reputation as the purest and cleanest lake in Europe.

Bottom Line: The modernisation of Annecy’s water management systems permitted its transition from a polluted body of water to one of Europe’s purest lakes.

* Please help my Water Scarcity students by commenting on unclear analysis, alternative perspectives, better data sources, or maybe just saying something nice 🙂

Valencia’s flood escape?

Bodil writes*

Valencia is known for its recurrent floods, with the first documented one occurring in October 1321. Since then, the city has experienced nearly 80 devastating floods over the years, caused by excess rainfall overwhelming the soil’s capacity to absorb the water fast enough. The river Turia, which runs through the city, brings death and destruction. The most impactful flood occurred in October 1957, when hundreds of people died, and three quarters of buildings were destroyed by waters rising five meters over their normal level. Something needed to be done to prevent such disasters from happening again (Valencia International).

Spain’s dictator Franco promised funding to reconstruct the city. Plan Sur proposed to divert the river around the city, and 16 years after the disaster, the Turia River was running 3 km south of Valencia for 12 km over a 175m-wide river bed (Caroline Angus).  The old river bed, now one of the biggest city parks in Europe (the Turia Gardens), is full of life and activities.

Map of the re-routing of the Turia

To regulate their waters, Valencia created reservoirs in case of drought and water escape routes in case of floods. Although the project might seem extreme and expensive, it is a necessary precaution to save lives and prevent the need for constant rebuilding. However, there are still very big quantities of water falling into this region, leading to a high risk of flooding. The 2022 record saw 260 mm of rain falling in 24 hours, with 2023’s record being about 150 mm in 24 hours. Considering that it rains on average 45 days a year and the annual rainfall is a bit less than 500 mm, this is a huge amount of water in just a few days.

In comparison, London receives approximately 600 mm of rainfall annually, yet it is known for experiencing a lot of rain as it rains approximately 112 days a year.  We would expect a bigger difference in mm, this shows just how immense the quantity of water that falls on the Valencia region in a day is. Even though the infrastructure has improved with the creation of immense storm drains, there are still many incidents of people getting trapped in their vehicles and houses getting flooded every year. In September 2023, there were already 30 severe incidents of flooding reported. Valencia’s greatest challenge is fighting drought for most of the year and then dealing with immense bodies of water that fall all at once.

Bottom Line: Valencia, a city going to extreme measures to keep the rare and great quantities of water out of the city.

* Please help my Water Scarcity students by commenting on unclear analysis, alternative perspectives, better data sources, or maybe just saying something nice 🙂

Crisis in the Caribbean

Melle writes*

St. Maarten is a beautiful holiday destination for many. With its alluring beaches, fantastic nightlife, many attractions and of course the crystal-clear ocean surrounding the island, it seems like a surreal place to a lot of visitors.  Unfortunately, its true nature does not match its promise of paradise. It faces many challenges, such as hurricanes, political instability, economic hardships, and infrastructural failures. And at the moment, it also faces an unforeseen challenge, namely a billing error within the one and only drinking water company.

GEBE is the sole supplier of drinking water on St. Maarten. They buy water from the three desalination plants (owned by Seven Seas Water) and transport it to their storage tanks.  From there, the water is brought to households through pipes that criss-cross the island.

GEBE’s pricing is progressive, meaning the more you use the more you pay: “If a household uses 3 cubic meters of water, they are charged NAF 2.50 per cubic meter, an additional 7 cubic meters will then cost them NAF 5.50 per cubic meter while anything over that amount will cost the customer NAF 6.00 per cubic meter.”  To put this into perspective, NAF 6.00 is equal to approximately 3 euros. This might not seem a lot, but 3 euros is a lot for most of the population, and it is in general a lot for a cubic meter of water.

Besides this “choice” from the drinking water monopolist GEBE, customers can get water from rain (not readily available), discharges (not drinkable), or bottled water (crazy expensive).

Since March 2022, GEBE has been issuing correct bills to only 50% of its customers due to a “cyber event that disrupted its computer systems”. To the other 50%, they have sent nothing or incorrect bills. GEBE has given limited explanations and has decided to “solve” the problem by sending all bills since March 2022 at once. Customers who have not paid anything for 18 months now face massive charges.

To make matters worse, the different water pricing mechanisms are not taken into account when merging the bills. Normally, if customers use 3 cubic meters of water, they will pay less per cubic meter than if they used 10. But this concept is completely ignored with merging.  Instead, GEBE’s customers pay the top price for every cubic meter of water they used over the past 20 months. For the 19% of locals living below the poverty line, this is simply not possible.

Bottom Line: Many of St. Maarten’s residents face a billing (or payment) crisis due to GEBE’s mistake and a “solution” that is causing financial pain for everyone, but especially the poorest.

* Please help my Water Scarcity students by commenting on unclear analysis, alternative perspectives, better data sources, or maybe just saying something nice 🙂

Toulon’s flood alert: erosion risk

Ness writes*

Le Gapeau is both the name of a river and a watershed in the south of France, Toulon, dominated by forests around its slopes, and urbanization and agriculture at the bottom of the watershed towards Hyeres (Rollet et al, 2022).

There is currently a sedimentary deficit in le Gapeau mainly due to extractions of granulates and sand that has been taking place since the 19th century. These “massive extractions” do not consider the dynamic nature of the rivers (SAGE, 2022). Between 1859 and 1986, measures were taken to reduce extractions, but illegal and “authorized” extractions continued. In 1966, the construction of the Hyeres airport used so much sediments that the river’s banks destabilized, reducing water quality and water retention. The government did not acknowledge those impacts, and information on them can only be found by talking with those who live by the river (riverains); there is no information on the internet (Capanni, 2022).

Nowadays, in the Golfe de Giens, a strong deficit in sediment is observed now of around 1 to 3 meters in 73 years, and in the rade d’Hyàeres, a natural zone classifies as a “Special zone of conservation,” erosion is important especially in the seasonal periods due to tourism (SAGE, 2022). Despite all of the above, it must be noted however that climate change exacerbated these issues regardless of human management, since increases in temperature increase the likelihood of storms, leading to even more erosion (Capanni, 2022). This affects the capacity of the water body to store water, leading to potentially water scarcity issues.

Extractions are not the only reason for sedimentary deficits. The presence of dams and weirs is argued to influence fluvial morphology. For instance, a definite issue causing presence was an anti-salt dam constructed in the 1970’s. This dam caused contamination of groundwater as well as siltation, which is the deposition of fine sediments, which now and in the future decreases the storage capacity of the river (Capanni, 2022).

Erosion has a direct impact on an already existing issue; the value of riparian areas. They are essential for the correct workings of the watercourse, they filter pollution, and habitat many species (SAGE, 2022). Farmers and riverains rely on these forests yet they do not care enough for them, which exacerbates issues of sedimentary changes as erosion degrades the health of these areas.

Flooding is especially exacerbated by this issue of deficits in sediment. The flood plain of Cuers drains le Gapeau and le Réal Martin, which are both main rivers of Le Gapeau watershed. There are sedimentary repositories in these plains, and during rain periods, flood plains are more likely to overflow (see image below) since they have a lower water holding capacity due to less sediment, which can also lead to erosion.

The floodplain of Cuers at the intersection between le Gapeau and Réal Martin. Source: Capanni (2022)

Bottom Line: Humans have taken too much sediment and erected too many barriers on Le Gapeau, thereby increasing flooding, lowering water quality, and harming ecosystems. Climate change will only worsen these impacts.

* Please help my Water Scarcity students by commenting on unclear analysis, alternative perspectives, better data sources, or maybe just saying something nice 🙂

Infrastructure Incapacity: Caracas

Isabella writes*

One would not expect to see a country ranked in the top 15 worldwide with the most freshwater resources (WorldAtlas, 2018) to also be one where 82% of the population does not continuously receive water (Reporte Nacional, Octubre 2018). Yet this is the case with Venezuela, and many of its issues manifest in the capital: Caracas. Though not the only aspect to blame, the capital’s ailing water infrastructure clearly explains this shocking statistic.

The Tuy System and its subsystems–Tuy I, Tuy II, and Tuy III–bring water to Caracas (“Trasvases en América,” 2023), which is then distributed by the public utility Hidrocapital (McMillan, 2020). Tuy I and Tuy II are both operating at half of their functional capacity (“Dealing with a Water Crisis and a Pandemic in Venezuela – Interactions between Water Security and COVID-19,” 2020), and this lack in productivity is exacerbated by the frequent blackouts the entire country experiences (McMillan, 2020). As Caracas is in a valley, it lacks its own local water sources, hence the Tuy System must pump water from sea level to approximately 2000m in altitude. Caracas is highly dependent on this electric pumping system which requires maintenance to function — and maintenance is lacking.

This absence can be attributed to a lack of institutional capacity (Rendon et al., 2019), which encapsulates corruption, brain drain, and a lack of funding. There is no way for procedures to be effectively monitored, enabling corrupt practices and the deterioration of the water system (Rendon et al., 2019). It is estimated that this malpractice causes losses of around 5400 litres of treated water per second in the distribution systems–this is not only negative for the residents who are unable to receive water, but the water sector themselves, who are losing money in the process (Reporte Nacional, Octubre 2018).

Regarding the actual approaches to improving maintenance, we run into another issue: brain drain. About 15% of the country’s population has fled since 2015, including many of the specialists needed to operate, maintain, and improve the water system (Rendon et al., 2019).

How can the systems be rebuilt without the necessary knowledge? Short answer: they can’t.

To further add complexity to addressing these issues, it must be noted that sanctions make it hard for Caracas to import replacement parts for repairs. Running an inefficient system functioning at half its capacity puts a larger strain on the parts, thus damaging the system more rapidly and therefore requiring even more maintenance–it is a never-ending cycle (McMillan, 2020).

There have been several initiatives to rationalize infrastructure and improve operations, but these have been delayed by budget shortfalls and project design changes. Some infrastructure investment agreements were even made with strategic partner countries, however decreased public oversight has fostered an environment fit for corruption and rushed decisions, ultimately leading to “white elephant infrastructure projects” (McMillan, 2020).

These issues with the water system are indubitably cause for concern, as they ultimately result in further problems: increased waterborne diseases (“Urban Water in Venezuela“), exacerbated effects on the already crippled public health system, and further social disparities, as barrios receive less water than urbanised areas (“Dealing with a Water Crisis and a Pandemic in Venezuela – Interactions between Water Security and COVID-19,” 2020). Therefore it is pertinent that the water systems be corrected–but that is much easier said than done.

Bottom Line: Caracas’s water system is consistently and rapidly depleting due to a lack of institutional capacity. Brain drain, corruption, and failing government systems have led to a near impossible situation to address in the water sector, yet it is most important that it be addressed quickly. More and more citizens lack access to safe, clean water — and there is no solution in sight.

* Please help my Water Scarcity students by commenting on unclear analysis, alternative perspectives, better data sources, or maybe just saying something nice 🙂